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Abstract 
Electoral observation missions (EOM) are designed to promote improvements in democratic 
quality by overseeing elections, but how successful are they? We argue that EOM tie the hands of 
incumbents, who have to adjust their electoral misconduct strategies, thus opening up political 
competition and making it more likely that the opposition will do well. Moreover, we propose that 
monitoring effects are conditioned by regime type, expecting that EOM presence has a stronger 
impact on electoral competition in autocracies than in democracies. Using a dataset of 580 
parliamentary and presidential elections in 108 countries between 1976 and 2009 we find support 
for our theoretical claims. EOM increase electoral competitiveness in dictatorships by reducing 
margins of victory for incumbents, but leave competition unaffected in democracies. Furthermore, 
our analysis indicates that, contrary to previous findings, EOM increase the probability of electoral 
turnover in dictatorships but have no effect on democracies.  
 
Keywords: electoral monitoring, electoral manipulation, electoral competitiveness, political 
competition, political regimes 
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Introduction 
In recent years, elections have spread across a variety of regimes around the world. Almost 
in parallel, international organizations have also made significant efforts to monitor elections, 
trying to ensure that standards of electoral quality are kept and promote democracy (OSCE 2010). 
A largely uncontested assumption made by international organizations is that Electoral 
Observation Missions (EOM) improve electoral procedures and increase the competitiveness of 
elections (EU 2016).1 
But how successful EOM really are in improving the quality of elections? This paper 
argues that EOM can enhance electoral competition, by tying the hands of incumbents and limiting 
their ability to use electoral manipulation. However, this is crucially conditioned by the type of 
political regime in place; electoral observation missions can be more effective in improving 
electoral competition in dictatorships, where manipulation is widespread and there is fertile ground 
for their involvement.2  
While there is an expanding literature on electoral manipulation (Ruiz-Rufino 2018), 
relatively little attention has been paid to understanding how monitoring affects electoral 
competition, and particularly how regime type conditions this relationship. This is surprising as 
monitoring is considered to have become a norm for some political regimes (Hyde 2011a) and 
misconduct is a relatively common occurrence especially in non-established democracies and 
dictatorships (Schedler 2002; Birch 2007; Alvarez et al. 2008; Çavdar 2008; Hyde and O'Mahony 
2010; Mebane and Kalinin 2010; Donno and Roussias 2012; Simpser 2012, 2013; Flores and 
Nooruddin 2016). However, upon closer inspection, the literature has yet to provide a clear answer 
                                                 
1
 See https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/water-diplomacy/421/election-observation-missions-eueoms_en. 
2
 We use the terms electoral manipulation and electoral misconduct interchangeably. Following Birch (2007), we 
XQGHUVWDQGHOHFWRUDOPLVFRQGXFWDV³DFWLYLWLHVWKDWOHDGWRDYLRODWLRQRIWKHµOHYHOSOD\LQJILHOG¶WKDWis ideal of electoral 
processes´S. 
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about the impact of monitoring on electoral competitiveness, and surprisingly, the role of political 
regimes is residual and theoretically undeveloped.  
In particular, work examining how EOM affect election quality (Kelley 2012), governance 
(Simpser and Donno 2012), electoral violence (Daxecker 2012, 2014), electoral boycotts (Beaulieu 
and Hyde 2009; Kelley 2011) or fiscal manipulation (Hyde and O'Mahony 2010) uses political 
regimes as a control variable but never examine its impact theoretically. Furthermore, 
experimental work has produced inconclusive results about the impact of monitoring on electoral 
competitiveness. While some studies suggest a positive effect of EOM on electoral competition 
(Hyde 2007; Enikolopov et al. 2013; Asunka et al. 2017 ), other work finds a negative one (Hyde 
2010; Ichino and Schündeln 2012; Buzin et al. 2016). Moreover, the role of political regimes 
cannot be assessed in these studies as the related experiments are conducted in single countries. 
Our paper adds to this open debate in two ways: first, by investigating how the presence of 
monitors affects electoral competition; and second, by attempting to clarify how political regimes 
mediate the relationship between EOM and competitiveness. We argue that having an election 
monitored restricts the ability of incumbents to engage in electoral misconduct by increasing the 
costs of manipulation and by creating the possibility of negative repercussions if their actions are 
unveiled. EOM can therefore condition LQFXPEHQWV¶ strategies and force them to adjust their 
manipulation tactics (Ichino and Schündeln 2012; Simpser and Donno 2012; Sjoberg 2014). This, 
in turn, opens up political space for opposition parties and increases the likelihood that they will 
perform better in elections. We thus expect that EOM presence should increase electoral 
competitiveness and improve the electoral showing of the opposition.   
Second, we highlight the importance of regime types and reflect on the role they play with 
respect to the effectiveness of monitoring. While electoral misconduct is a phenomenon we 
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encounter across all regimes, its occurrence and extent is more pronounced in autocracies (Kelley 
and Kolev 2010). We argue that the presence of electoral observers should be more consequential 
in autocracies, where manipulation is more prevalent and thus the likelihood of improving the 
quality of elections should be higher. If EOM presence restricts the use of manipulation, then 
political competition should open up more in autocracies than in democracies, where elections are 
likely to be more competitive anyway. Additionally, EOM presence in autocracies can embolden 
opposition parties, which can intensify their campaign activities and become vocal against acts of 
manipulation, further improving electoral competitiveness. Therefore, we expect that the presence 
of international monitors should have a stronger impact in autocratic than in democratic regimes.  
Our analysis indicates that the presence of monitors affects electoral competitiveness by 
reducing the margins of victory between incumbents and the opposition. The effect is robust and 
substantively important, yet it manifests itself only in non-democracies. Moreover, we find that 
the presence of EOM increases the likelihood of opposition victory in dictatorships, but has no 
effect in democracies. These novel findings constitute an important contribution to our 
understanding of electoral monitoring and its effectiveness. They suggest that EOM presence is 
most influential in regimes where political liberties are not entrenched and the quality of electoral 
competition is questionable. As such, election monitoring should not be perceived simply as a tool 
rulers use to increase legitimacy, but could provide, under certain conditions, also an important 
service in the promotion of democratization around the world.  
The observable implications of our theory are tested using an original dataset containing 
information on 580 parliamentary and presidential elections in 108 countries between 1976 and 
2009. Our empirical strategy takes into account an important selection issue, as the choice to invite 
an EOM could be related to the decision to use tools of manipulation during the election. This is a 
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problem that exists in most research analyzing the role of EOM in electoral competition (Beaulieu 
and Hyde 2009; Kelley 2011, 2012; Simpser and Donno 2012; Daxecker 2012, 2014) and could 
compromise the validity of the analysis. We address this issue using both an instrumental variables 
approach and matching in order to correct any potential bias in our estimations.  
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. The next two sections discuss the tradeoffs 
countries face when deciding to invite missions and how monitoring can FRQGLWLRQLQFXPEHQWV¶
misconduct strategies. Section 4 discusses political regimes and how their dynamics condition the 
effect EOM have on electoral competition. Section 5 presents our data, while sections 6 and 7 
discuss our empirical findings and a series of robustness tests. We conclude summarizing our 
contribution and discussing some policy recommendations as well as extensions of our research. 
 
Tradeoffs Associated with EOM 
Incumbents, whether in young democracies or in contested authoritarian regimes, care 
about the legitimation of their regimes. International legitimacy is important as it conditions the 
supply of various forms of benefits for developing countries. International aid or membership in 
transnational organizations are often linked with various kinds of conditionalities (World Bank 
2005). Protection of human rights, respect of civil liberties, or fairness of elections are common 
requirements for entering organizations such as the European Union or the Organization of 
American States. Respecting the rule of law is equally important for foreign investors who wish 
to undertake significant investments and worry about property rights (Biglaiser and Staats 2010).  
One clear quality test for states comes in the form of international observation missions. 
EOM can offer a stamp of approval on regimes that hold elections if they issue a positive verdict 
regarding the quality of the elections. Several international organizations, like the EU, the OSCE, 
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the OAS, the Carter Center or ECOWAS, have set up dedicated agencies that deal specifically 
with observing elections. In fact, monitoring has become so widespread that it is considered an 
international norm (Hyde 2011a, 2011b) and regimes holding elections are expected to invite 
missions, otherwise they risk having their elections branded as manipulated.3 
However, inviting an EOM is not an automatic decision for incumbents. One of the goals 
of missions is to ensure that elections are conducted in a free and fair fashion and often issue 
negative reports about the quality of elections. According to some calculations, around half of 
EOM reports indicate significant problems with the conduct of elections (Kelley 2012). Assuming 
that incumbents do not wish to be branded by the international community as cheaters, inviting an 
EOM is not a costless action. The decision is a difficult one as some incumbents have to consider 
the likelihood of receiving a negative verdict and the repercussions that may follow.  
The costs of a negative EOM report are significant both internationally and domestically. 
Internationally, there may be sanctions, including the withholding of economic aid or the freezing 
of trade.4 Domestically, opposition parties may use negative reports to appeal the results of 
elections and stir up protests, seeking political gain (Beaulieu and Hyde 2009; Hyde and Marinov 
2014). For example, the 2004 Presidential elections in Ukraine were seriously questioned by 
international monitors and these fraud allegations spurred demonstrations that forced the 
government to repeat the elections which eventually ousted the incumbent.5  
 
Consequences of Inviting an EOM 
                                                 
3
 Note that EOM have to be invited by the country holding elections and accept the invitation, for a mission to occur.  
4
 See, for example, the sanctions imposed by the EU to Belarus following the 2006 Presidential elections (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:134:0001:0011:EN:PDF).  
5
 See the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report on the 2004 Presidential Elections in Ukraine 
(http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/14674?download=true). 
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Electoral observation missions can be seen as information signaling tools. Hyde and 
Marinov (2014) argue that EOM provide reliable information about the quality of elections. Little 
(2012, 2015) claims that inviting electoral monitors reduces the amount of manipulation 
incumbents can use and makes it more likely that citizens will trust the electoral outcome. 
Relatedly, Simpser (2013) links the use of manipulation with the information elections reveal 
about the relative strength of the incumbent and challengers. We focus however, on the impact 
monitoring missions have on electoral competitiveness. 
To analyze the effects of monitoring we first need to understand under what conditions a 
government would invite an electoral observation mission; to do that we make three assumptions. 
First, we assume that incumbents seek reelection. Second, we assume that incumbents who invite 
an EOM seek a positive endorsement from the monitoring organization. No incumbent, ceteris 
paribus, would prefer a negative to a positive EOM verdict, although some incumbents may be 
more averse than others to a lack of an endorsement.6 Third, incumbents have the capacity to 
employ electoral misconduct in their quest for re-election. The propensity to use such tools will 
YDU\EDVHGRQWKHUXOHU¶V³W\SH´ZKLOHVRPHZRXOGQRWFRQVLGHUHPSOR\LQJPDQLSXODWLRQRWKHUV
would be more than ready to cheat electorally. Finally, it is important to note that our analysis 
focuses on regimes holding elections where political competition is either incipient or not well-
established. This excludes long-lasting democracies where elections are typically of high quality.7 
                                                 
6
 We can think of incumbents as aligned along a continuum of exposure to pressure, based on their international 
linkage (Levitsky and Way 2010); some will be less sensitive than others to EOM reports. Moreover, assuming that 
not all rulers care equally about negative reports is consistent with the fact that some engage in public acts of 
manipulation (Simpser 2013). 
7
 The typically high quality of elections in established democracies does not necessarily imply that EOM missions are 
not invited. For example, OSCE members are expected to receive an OSCE mission. For established democracies, 
these missions are focused more on issues such as party financing, enfranchisement or the use of new technologies 
than on actually deploying large number of observers to monitor the key stages of the election (see 
https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/deciding-where-to-observe). 
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These assumptions combined with the trade-offs discussed above provide a framework that 
can help us understand when EOM are invited: while a positive mission report can increase 
legitimacy, a negative one involves significant pitfalls, like economic sanctions and internal 
instability (Daxecker 2012; Daxecker and Schneider 2014). This is especially pertinent for rulers 
considering the use of misconduct. Some may choose not to take that risk, and do not invite 
international observers.8 For those leaders, the electoral outcome is paramount and using 
misconduct to secure victory outweighs any EOM related benefits. However, the decision not to 
invite an EOM is costly as it can be perceived as equivalent to committing electoral manipulation 
and may erode the regime´s legitimacy (Hyde 2011a, 2011b).  
Hence, there is significant pressure to invite EOM, regardless of the decision to cheat. 
When missions are invited to monitor elections, three scenarios unfold. First, some rulers may 
decide to avoid electoral fraud completely. Second, some may be determined to cheat but EOM 
presence forces them to limit the extent of electoral misconduct. Finally, there may be rulers who 
cheat regardless of EOM presence but will try to conceal it in an attempt to minimize the 
probability of receiving a negative election report. These scenarios point to different mechanisms 
that can help us understand how EOM presence can impact electoral competition.  
The most drastic effect EOM presence may have is to induce the abandonment of electoral 
misconduct. In the absence of manipulation during the pre-electoral period, opposition parties can 
promote their platforms unobstructed and conduct a more effective campaign in a harassment-free 
environment Also, the lack of election-day manipulation would produce results that accurately 
                                                 
8
 This suggests that rulers not considering the use of fraud should always invite EOM, as they would only stand to 
gain from their presence in terms of legitimacy. It also forces us to think about the distinct effects regimes have with 
respect to inviting missions; this is discussed in the next section. However, we should be careful not to assume that all 
LQFXPEHQWVLQGHPRFUDFLHVDUH³FOHDQ´DQGWKRVHLQGLFWDWRUVKLSV³FKHDW´7KHUHLVLPSRUWDQWYDULDWLRQLQLQFXPEHQW
types within each regime, as well as to their decision to employ manipulation; there are plenty of rulers in democracies 
that use misconduct, while we also find autocracies where elections are clean (Donno and Roussias 2012).  
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reflect vRWHUV¶SUHIHUHQFHV. Opposition parties would benefit from the absence of manipulation, 
and this should be manifested by an improved electoral outcome. 
A second, and more realistic scenario, is that EOM presence will reduce, but not eradicate, 
the amount of misconduct. Limiting the use of misconduct should facilitate the electoral chances 
of opposition parties by, inter alia, allowing them to run relatively unobstructed campaigns. Of 
course, the impact of the effect depends on the type and extent of manipulation that incumbents 
use. One could assume that incumbents would minimize infractions more likely to be noted, like 
ballot stuffing or faulty counting, and utilize subtler tools such as biasing the media environment 
(Hyde 2008). Another possibility is that rulers change the timing of manipulation, focusing on pre-
electoral activities, such as biasing the electoral system, tampering with voter and party registration 
or with campaign finance rules (Frank and Martinez i Coma 2017). Limiting the use of blatant 
tools of misconduct should benefit the opposition; yet, research has exhibited that subtler tactics, 
like pre-election misconduct, can be a potent tool for incumbents (Donno and Roussias 2012).  
A third scenario is that rulers, instead of limiting, attempt to conceal the use of electoral 
misconduct trying to eschew EOM condemnation (Daxecker and Schneider 2014). Covering up 
misconduct is a costly and time-consuming expedition, using valuable resources that could be 
otherwise employed elsewhere (Kelley 2012). For example, incumbents may divert manipulation 
to unmonitored regions to avoid getting caught, or rely on less effective tools than the ones they 
would have liked to use (Ichino and Schündeln 2012; Asunka et al. 2017). Overall, the attempt to 
conceal misconduct should facilitate a better electoral performance for the opposition by 
increasing the cost of misconduct and reducing its effectiveness.9  
                                                 
9
 It is important to note that EOM presence can have some negative consequences, while at the same time improving 
electoral competitiveness. One deleterious effect is that displacement, concealment or alteration of the type of 
misconduct used, in the attempt to avoid negative reports, will hinder the ability of observers to detect fraud. Moreover, 
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EOM and Regime Dynamics 
These scenarios illustrate that, in the presence of international monitors, the opposition 
should perform better electorally regardless of the behavior of the incumbent. Hence, our 
expectation is that inviting an EOM should open up political competition. The electoral fortunes 
of the opposition are, however, related to the political regime under which elections occur. 
Surprisingly, political regimes are hardly considered in the literature analyzing the relationship of 
EOM with electoral competition. Most of the existing work on this question either holds political 
regimes constant (Hyde 2007, 2010; Ichino and Schündeln 2012; Enikolopov et al. 2013; Buzin et 
al. 2016; Asunka et al. 2017), uses them as a control variable or as a determinant of case selection 
(Beaulieu and Hyde 2009; Hyde and O'Mahony 2010; Kelley 2011, 2012; Daxecker 2012, 2014; 
Simpser and Donno 2012). Thus, we lack a proper understanding of how political regimes 
condition the way EOM affect electoral competition.  
As Przeworski illustrates, voting in democracies can be understood as ³IOH[LQJPXVFOHV´
(Przeworski 1999). This is so because in democratic regimes both government and opposition 
parties typically have access to significant economic and human resources that can be used in the 
presence of electoral manipulation. This indicates that incumbents intending to cheat in 
democracies assume a greater level of risk if fraud is detected. Empirical evidence corroborating 
this view shows that democracies, while not immune from the use of manipulation, are less likely 
to employ it in comparison to dictatorships (Kelley and Kolev 2010). The relatively limited use 
and extent of electoral fraud in democracies implies that the presence of EOM in those regimes 
would probably result in only marginal improvements in electoral quality. It also suggests that 
                                                 
LQVRPHLQVWDQFHVDGMXVWPHQWVLQPDQLSXODWLRQWDFWLFVPD\DFWXDOO\OHDGWRWKHDGRSWLRQRIPRUH³HIIHFWLYH´WRROV
such as the use of pre-election misconduct (Donno and Roussias 2012).   
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democracies should be more likely to extend invitations to EOM, as incumbents not engaging in 
fraud would not be worried about the possibility of a negative report.  
Furthermore, in democracies, opposition parties are able to oversee the electoral process 
(even in the absence of EOM) and denounce misconduct without significant restrictions.10 Among 
other things, they could mobilize their supporters in demonstrations, or use media access to 
publicize fraud. Regardless of the strategy used by the opposition, the cost of denouncing 
manipulation in democracies should be smaller than in non-democracies making it easier for the 
opposition to publicly condemn it. The capacity of the opposition to mobilize resources in 
democracies may act as a deterrent mechanism for incumbents tempted to cheat (Lehoucq 2002; 
Norris 2014; Norris et al. 2014). 
Things are different in autocracies. The presence of EOM in authoritarian regimes should 
alter the dynamics of electoral competition as monitoring would be likely to cause significant 
reductions in the extent of misconduct. The deployment of observers would condition the strategies 
of incumbents wishing to rig elections. Relatedly, the presence of international monitors in 
autocracies can embolden the opposition and indirectly help it intensify its campaign activities, 
which would also improve its electoral chances and increase electoral competitiveness.  
Moreover, public condemnation of electoral manipulation is not easy in authoritarian 
regimes, where opposition forces are, on average, weaker than in democracies, and face more 
repression (Bhasin and Gandhi 2013). Elections in authoritarian regimes tend to be tightly 
controlled by the state apparatus (Simpser 2013) and any loss of control over the electoral process 
± because of the presence of an EOM, for example ± could be exploited by the opposition 
(Magaloni 2006; Lust-Okar 2009; Gandhi 2010). The presence of EOM in authoritarian regimes 
                                                 
10
 This should be facilitated by the presence of independent electoral management bodies (Frank and Martinez i Coma 
2017), even though citizens in established democracies are not always trusting of them (Birch 2008). 
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could therefore impact the competitiveness of elections in an additional way, as it may encourage 
a stronger stance by opposition parties against the use of manipulation.  
Given the different ways by which EOM may alter the electoral dynamics across regimes, 
we expect the presence of international monitors to have a greater effect on electoral 
competitiveness in authoritarian than in democratic regimes. This differential effect could be 
channeled by the mechanisms proposed above; either by the higher likelihood to reduce 
manipulation in non-democracies, or by making it more likely that opposition forces would 
become more active during campaigns and vocal against the use of manipulation. The following 
hypotheses summarize our theoretical expectations: 
H1: EOM presence should improve electoral competitiveness.  
H2: EOM presence in authoritarian regimes should have a stronger positive effect on 
electoral competitiveness than in democratic ones. 
 
Data and Variables 
To test our expectations, we compiled a dataset combining information on EOM and 
electoral outcomes.  Monitoring data does not only refer to whether a country was monitored, but 
also to the level of democraticness of the organizations conducting the monitoring.11 We also 
collected electoral data coding incumbent and opposition SDUWLHV¶ performance.12 We included all 
countries holding multiparty elections that are not established democracies.13 We thus focus our 
                                                 
11
 We discuss this in detail below, when presenting the variable constraints. 
12
 Electoral information was collected through a variety of sources, including official electoral commission results, as 
well as data handbooks (Nohlen 1993, 2005; Nohlen et al. 1999; Nohlen et al. 2001; Nohlen and Stöver 2010). 
13
 We exclude established democracies as they regularly hold elections of high quality and electoral misconduct is not 
considered a potential tool for incumbents. Established democracies are operationalized as those that have been coded 
democratic for more than 25 consecutive years, following the regime type classification by Cheibub, Gandhi and 
Vreeland (2010). We relax this rule for countries where significant allegations of fraud exist and monitors have issued 
negative reports about the quality of elections. This rule affects the Dominican Republic and Venezuela, which are 
included in the analysis. Rerunning the analysis excluding these two countries leaves results unaffected. 
13 
 
attention on new democracies, as well as on dictatorships holding multiparty elections. The 
resulting dataset includes results from 580 parliamentary and presidential elections occurring in 
108 countries between 1976 and 2009. The unit of analysis is election year; we look at legislative 
elections for parliamentary systems and executive ones for presidential systems. For semi-
presidential systems we examine both legislative and executive elections when they are not 
concurrent; when they occur concurrently we only use parliamentary elections.14 
We focus our attention on the electoral performance of the incumbent and the largest 
opposition party. In most cases it is straightforward identifying incumbent parties; the main 
exception is parliamentary systems with a coalition government; in those cases, we code as the 
incumbent the party of the Prime Minister at the time of the election. Opposition parties are 
identified case by case and exclude those aligned with the incumbent or satellite ones. For founding 
elections after a transition to democracy, cases are included only in instances when a 
candidate/party clearly linked with the outgoing regime runs.15  
To test our theoretical arguments we use two different dependent variables. First, we use a 
proxy for electoral competitiveness that we call vote margin. This variable measures the margin 
of victory for the incumbent; higher margins indicate less competitive elections. The variable is 
calculated by subtracting the vote share of the biggest opposition party from that obtained by the 
incumbent; the variable is positive if the opposition loses and negative when the opposition wins. 
When presidential elections have two rounds, vote margin reflects the electoral results of the first 
round. The variable has a mean value of 15.6%.16 
                                                 
14
 For robustness purposes, we also conducted the analysis using presidential elections for concurrent semi-presidential 
systems; results remain the same.  
15
 For example, in the 1999 Niger elections, following a military dictatorship, no candidates were linked to the previous 
regime; the election is not coded as no incumbent can be identified. In contrast, in the Central African Republic, 
following his own 2003 coup, ruler Francois Bozize competed in the 2005 presidential race; this instance is coded as 
an incumbent can be identified.  
16
 Table A1 in the Appendix contains the relevant descriptive information of the variables used in our analysis. 
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Our second dependent variable, opposition victory, codes instances where an opposition 
party has deposed the incumbent following an election. The variable takes the value one for 
presidential elections when an opposition candidate wins the presidency, either in the first or the 
second round. For legislative elections, opposition victories are coded whenever the incumbent 
party is unable to form a government, either alone or as part of a coalition. This almost always 
coincides with instances where an opposition party won the largest share of seats in Parliament.17 
Our main independent variable is a dichotomous one, EOM, indicating whether an 
international electoral observation mission was present during a particular election. The data was 
compiled through a combination of EOM reports, the NELDA dataset (Hyde and Marinov 2012) 
and the Kelley and Kolev (2010) dataset.18  
Our second independent variable, democracy, is also binary and indicates whether a 
country is a democracy or an autocracy;19 this variable is constructed using the autocratic regimes 
                                                 
17
 Rare cases where the incumbent won the largest seat share but was unable to form a government are coded as 
opposition victories, as they signify inability to hold on to power. Such an example is the 2002 Hungarian election 
where the opposition parties MSZP and the Alliance of Free Democrats formed a coalition government despite the 
IDFWWKDW)LGHV]WKH30¶VSDUW\UHPDLQHGWKHODUJHVWSDUW\LQ3DUOLDPHQW(Benoit and Schiemann 2001). 
18
 :HXVHWKHGDWDFROOHFWHGE\.HOOH\DQG.ROHY¶VWRLGHQWLI\(20WKDWWRRNSODFHLQWKHSHULRG-2004. 
Kelley and Kolev´s data provides detailed information for all EOM during that period based on the monitoring reports 
generated by the organizing institutions; the variable is, hence, well measured. From 2004 onwards, we expanded the 
list of monitored countries using the following criteria. First, we looked at NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012) to check 
whether a particular election was reported as monitored (variables NELDA45 and NELDA46). Second, we looked for 
evidence confirming the existence of that EOM using the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network (http://aceproject.org/); 
this was necessary as we found some discrepancies between the data provided by NELDA and the actual existence of 
monitors after 2004. Accordingly, we classified elections via the following procedure: a) when NELDA45 indicated 
that an election was monitored and we found evidence of the existence of that mission - for example a provisional or 
final monitoring report we classified the election as monitored; b) all countries coded by NELDA as not monitored 
were cross-referenced with the ACE dataset and no discrepancies were found. These cases were classified as not-
monitored; c) finally we did not code an election as monitored if NELDA indicated that an EOM had been present but 
we were unable to find any evidence supporting that claim. For example, NELDA45 and NELDA46 indicate the 
existence of non-Western Monitors in the 2009 Presidential Elections in Algeria. However, we did not find any 
election report from either major Western or non-Western IGOs and INGOs on that particular election (see also 
http://carnegie-mec.org/2009/04/13/lessons-from-algeria-s-2009-presidential-election).  
19
 While there is no consensus in the literature about how to measure democracy (Munck and Verkuilen 2002; 
Coppedge et al. 2015), a concern could be that a dichotomous measure may be too blunt of an instrument for 
distinguishing regimes, particularly since our cases are countries holding multiparty elections and may fall somewhere 
in-between the extremes of a democracy/autocracy continuum. To address these concerns we conducted several tests, 
using the Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) measure. Tables S1 to S18 in the Online Supplementary material 
repeat the main estimations of our analysis using various thresholds of this variable and results hold.  
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dataset (Geddes et al. 2014).20 We expect that on average democracies will have smaller margins 
of victory as they typically have higher quality elections. Moreover, following our theoretical 
argument, we anticipate that regime type conditions both the quality of elections and the ability of 
monitors to observe them; we thus interact democracy with EOM to capture that effect. We expect 
that the presence of monitors in dictatorships should have a more pronounced positive effect on 
electoral competitiveness, since dictators are more likely to use manipulation tactics.  
We also include several control variables related to the electoral setting; Election type 
indicates whether the election is parliamentary or presidential; First election is a dummy variable 
capturing the extraordinary nature of the first multiparty elections. We also include GDP per capita 
(logged) as measured by the World Bank; as the level of economic development is associated with 
several political phenomena we believe that it is important to examine if it affects the level of 
electoral competitiveness. Finally, the margin of victory in the previous election is included to 
capture the effect that the level of electoral competitiveness in the past may have.21 
 
Monitoring and Electoral Performance of the Opposition 
The main model that we use to evaluate our expectations is the following: ܸ݋ݐ݁ܯܽݎ݃݅݊௖ǡ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߜଵܧܱܯ௖ǡ௧ ൅ ߜଶܦ݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௖ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଵܫ݊ݐ݁ݎܽܿݐ݅݋݊௖ǡ௧൅ߠܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௖ǡ௧ ൅ ௖ߴ  
Where Vote Margin refers to margin of victory; EOM indicates whether a country is 
monitored; Democracy refers to political regime and Interaction captures the combined effect of 
                                                 
20
 We use the Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) coding of autocracies as our main regime type variable, and the 
Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) coding for robustness purposes. The reason that we do not use the Cheibub et 
al measure as our primDU\YDULDEOHLVEHFDXVHRILWV³DOWHUQDWLRQUXOH´ZKHUHE\UHJLPHVthat did experience alternation 
are retroactively coded as democratic (up to the point where elections were introduced or new electoral rules was 
adopted). This retroactive coding may create issues with our ability to properly estimate the differential effects of 
regimes on the competitiveness of elections. Results hold when running the analysis using the Cheibub et al coding.  
21
 Our models also included district magnitude to capture the effect of the electoral system (Cox 1997). District 
magnitude is, however, never significant and omitting the variable leaves results unaffected. For the sake of 
parsimony, we decided to exclude district magnitude from the analysis presented. Results are available upon request. 
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EOM and Democracy. The parameter ߠ refers to a vector of control variables and ௖ߴ captures 
country fixed effects. All observations in our dataset refer to country c in election-year t. The 
parameters of interest are ߜଵ, ߜଶ and ߚଵ which capture the combined effect of our main independent 
variables (Brambor et al. 2006). To estimate the parameters, we used a series of OLS models22 
which are summarized in Table 1.23 
Table 1 ± OLS results (summary) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Pooled Democracy Autocracy Pooled Democracy Autocracy 
VARIABLES Vote 
Margin 
Vote 
Margin 
Vote 
Margin 
Opposition 
Victory 
Opposition 
Victory 
Opposition 
Victory 
EOM -20.12*** -3.66 -22.11*** 0.14** 0.15* 0.13* 
 (5.850) (3.598) (6.536) (0.065) (0.077) (0.075) 
Democracy -24.38***   0.30***   
 (7.877)   (0.103)   
Interaction 17.83**   -0.02   
 (7.452)   (0.090)   
Observations 412 262 150 425 270 155 
R-squared 0.080 0.057 0.181 0.067 0.067 0.086 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
# Countries 104 69 58 105 70 59 
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Consistent with our expectations, EOM presence improves electoral competitiveness by 
reducing margins of victory (model 1). However, as hypothesized, this effect varies by regime 
type. Figure 1 shows the effect of monitors on vote margins once political regime is considered. 
As expected, EOM have a much stronger (and statistically significant) effect on electoral 
competition in autocracies, substantively reducing the margin of victory for incumbents. However, 
margins of victory in democracies are unaffected by the presence of monitors. As suggested above, 
this could be the consequence of fraud being less likely to occur in democracies.24  
 
                                                 
22
 Table A2 in the Appendix presents the full results of the models shown in Table 1. 
23
 In all tables robust standard errors are in parentheses and *** indicate p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1. 
24
 Our data supports this observation. Combining the DIEM dataset (Kelley and Kolev 2010) with our data shows that 
the quality of elections was acceptable in about 70% of monitored democracies, compared to only 50% of autocracies. 
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Figure 1 ± EOM effect on Vote Margin (OLS estimates with 95% CI). 
  
In the case of autocracies, EOM reduce margins of victory by 20% approximately. To 
visualize the effect of EOM in autocracies, Figure 2 estimates the predicted value of margins of 
victory depending on being monitored or not. As the graph shows, in the absence of monitors, the 
difference between the incumbent´s and the opposition´s vote-share is about 50%. However, when 
monitors are assessing the electoral process, this decreases to almost 28%.  
While the magnitude of the effect is impressive, the fact that on average incumbents enjoy 
high margins of victory, even in the presence of monitors, raises questions about the impact EOM 
have on electoral turnover. As the literature has shown, some autocrats may open up political 
competition strategically, in order to survive in power (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, 2006; 
Magaloni 2008). The case of Togo illustrates this well. Togo held presidential elections in 1993 
where the ruling party Rally of the Togolese People (RTP) obtained 96.5% of the vote (elections 
were monitored, as were subsequent ones). Post-1993 RTP saw its electoral support decrease 
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significantly, falling even below 60% at times. Simultaneously, the opposition party Union of 
Forces for Change (UFC) enjoyed strong electoral results, reaching 38% in 2005. Nonetheless, 
RTP remained in power throughout the period. This shows that while monitoring may open-up 
competition, it does not necessarily mean that incumbents will be deposed, casting doubt on the 
impact of EOM in promoting democracy.  
Figure 2 ± Vote Margin in autocracies (OLS estimates with 95% CI). 
 
To test the effect of EOM on electoral turnover, we move on to the analysis of our second 
dependent variable, opposition victory (Table 1). Figure 3 depicts the effect of EOM presence on 
electoral turnover across regimes; as expected, EOM have a significant impact only in 
autocracies.25 Opposition victories in autocracies increase by about 14 percent when monitored; in 
                                                 
25
 To ease comparability of results across different models, we use a Linear Probability Model (LPM). The results 
hold if we use logit instead. 
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contrast, EOM presence does not affect significantly the rate of turnover in democracies. These 
findings are consistent with our argument that regime type conditions EOM effects, and offer a 
novel insight about the impact of monitoring: the presence of electoral observers does improve 
electoral competitiveness only in autocracies. 
Figure 3 ± EOM effect on Opposition Victory (OLS estimates with 95% CI). 
 
Robustness tests 
Selection Issues 
A potential source of bias in our analysis comes from an important selection issue. 
Estimating the effect of EOM presence is problematic, as rulers considering the use of 
manipulation would be reluctant to invite EOM. Incumbents are aware that monitors will scrutinize 
their actions and, therefore, attempts to rig the elections will be hindered. Rulers considering an 
EOM invitation will thus make that decision in conjunction with their attempt to commit fraud.  
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Moreover, the decision to manipulate elections is related to the anticipated strength of the 
opposition. Stronger opposition parties should increase the probability of the use of manipulation, 
as incumbents seek reelection; this should also affect the likelihood that an incumbent will invite 
an EOM. Rulers facing weaker opposition should be more willing to invite EOM, while those 
unsure about the outcome of the elections should be more reluctant to do so; for them, the presence 
of international monitors would limit the ability to manipulate the election, while increasing the 
risk of losing power and of receiving a negative report. This creates issues with estimating the true 
effect of the presence of monitors. If the decision to invite monitors is related with the anticipated 
electoral outcome, then any estimates we would get from an empirical analysis using the presence 
of EOM as an independent variable would be biased (Angrist and Pischke 2008). We use two 
different approaches to deal with this issue: instrumental variables (IV) and matching. 
To employ IV, we need to find a suitable instrument for EOM presence so that the effect 
of monitoring on electoral competition can be properly identified. To this purpose, we use two 
alternative instruments. First, we use a variable that captures the emergence of EOM as an 
international norm. Hyde (2011a, 2011b) argues that the increase in the number of new 
democracies after the collapse of communism increased the incentives of true democrats to invite 
monitors. This became so pervasive that it transformed into a norm; incumbents are expected to 
invite monitors, as doing otherwise is almost equivalent to admitting manipulation.  
We believe that the collapse of the communist bloc is a valid instrument as it can satisfy 
the exclusion criterion. Our variable Post-1989 can be used to predict the presence of monitors, as 
it coincides with the creation of the norm of monitoring, but at the same time cannot be directly 
linked with our dependent variables. We believe that the collapse of communism does not 
systematically predict the margin by which incumbents win elections, or whether a turnover would 
21 
 
occur. After 1989 there was great variation in regime types and electoral quality26 which implies 
that, beyond its hypothesized link with monitoring, the collapse of the communist bloc cannot be 
directly associated with our dependent variables, and thus should be a valid instrument.27  
Our second instrument is similar to the one used by Simpser and Donno to estimate the 
effect of monitoring on governance (2012). We use the regional level of monitoring in the two 
years preceding an election to instrument for EOM presence.28 The identification strategy is based 
on the idea that as countries start inviting EOM they are likely to create pressure among 
neighboring ones to do the same. Moreover, beyond this contagion mechanism, regional variation 
in organizational capacity is likely to influence the propensity to invite monitors across the region. 
Furthermore, as Simpser and Donno (2012) argue, the rate of monitoring in a region depends on 
the number of countries holding elections; this can change drastically if exogenous shocks, like 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, are observed. Monitoring organizations may take some time to 
catch up with the increased demand for monitoring (ODIHR 2005), which is consistent with the 
idea that regional rates of monitoring can be a good predictor for the likelihood to invite an EOM. 
We also believe that the regional rate of monitoring satisfies the exclusion restriction. While the 
                                                 
26
 For example, looking at Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics one can observe a vast array of regimes 
emerging post-1989. While some countries held relatively high quality elections (such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary 
and Poland), others found it more difficult to do so, often staging fraudulent elections in severely restricted political 
environments (such as Azerbaijan, Belarus, or Kyrgyzstan). This suggests that the often used argument of increased 
electoral competitiveness and democraticness post-1989 does not hold across the board, and as such it is unlikely that 
the proposed instrument systematically predicts our dependent variables.  
27
 To examine the validity of post-1989 as an instrument we tried to address several potential concerns. First, some 
worry that after 1989 elections became more competitive across regimes; we compared the average margins of victory 
pre and post-1989 and found no such evidence. In democracies vote margins increase post-1989, while they decrease 
marginally in dictatorships. Second, some argue that we are more likely to observe democracies post-1989, and as 
such competitiveness of elections should increase. Comparing rates of democracies and dictatorships in both periods, 
using three different regime measures (Cheibub et al 2010, Geddes et al 2011, POLITY IV), we find no such evidence.  
28
 Regional rate of monitoring is calculated as the percentage of elections that were monitored in the region in the 
previous two years. We categorize countries in six regions: Central Asia, Asia, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, 
Africa, and South America. 
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rate of regional monitoring is likely to create pressure for incumbents to invite EOM, it does not 
appear plausible that it affects the competitiveness of elections by any other channel.29  
Table 2 ± 2SLS analysis using Vote Margin as dependent variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pooled Autocracies Democracies Pooled Autocracies Democracies 
EOM -61.98*** -63.05*** -1.581 -65.46*** -67.08*** -2.989 
 (15.643) (14.542) (12.00) (14.691) (14.456) (28.30) 
Democracy -55.83***   -52.77**   
 (17.685)   (22.292)   
Interaction 60.01***   55.22**   
 (19.856)   (27.636)   
Observations 412 150 262 412 150 262 
R-squared 0.606 0.654 0.438 0.590 0.627 0.439 
Instrument Post 1989 Post 1989 Post 1989 EOM 2Y  EOM 2Y  EOM 2Y  
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Using these two instruments we re-estimate our analysis and Table 2 presents the main 
coefficients in the models estimated.30 To ensure the orthogonality of the residuals, each stage is 
estimated with OLS, which provides a linear approximation of the probability density function of 
the outcome variable (Angrist and Pischke 2008). In our estimations, the two interactive models 
(Models 1 and 4) show that the instruments are valid, however, they appear to be weak. This 
problem is overcome when we break down the estimation by regime type. Models 2 and 5 show 
estimations for autocracies and both instruments produce a significant coefficient in the first stage 
                                                 
29
 One could expect that regional levels of monitoring are partly determined by electoral competitiveness in the region. 
To test this hypothesis, we regressed regional rates of monitoring on our dependent variable; we do not find that 
competitiveness predicts monitoring rates and interpret this as evidence consistent with the exclusion restriction. 
30
 Table A3 in the Appendix presents the 2SLS estimates for margins of victory using separately post-1989 and 2-year 
EOM regional rates as instruments. We also run a model where we used both instruments together but the model did 
not improve and 2-year regional EOM was not statistically significant in the first stage. 
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regression, and improve their strength.31 Models 3 and 6 show estimations for democracies, where 
EOM presence does not have an effect on margins of victory.32 
We repeat the analysis using opposition victory as the dependent variable and Table 3 
shows the 2SLS results of our estimations.33 Similar to what we observed in our previous analysis, 
after using the full sample (models 1 and 4) both instruments are valid but weak; however, the 
problem disappears when we break down the analysis by regime type. The analysis reveals, again, 
that the presence of EOM increases significantly the likelihood of opposition victories in 
autocracies,34 whereas in democracies electoral observation missions have no effect.35 
Table 3 ± 2SLS coefficients using Opposition Victory as dependent variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pooled Autocracies Democracies Pooled Autocracies Democracies 
EOM 0.60*** 0.54*** 0.31 0.54** 0.56*** -0.269 
 (0.177) (0.185) (0.303) (0.223) (0.187) (0.773) 
Democracy 0.58***   0.81*   
 (0.225)   (0.460)   
Interaction -0.39   -0.73   
 (0.284)   (0.623)   
Observations 425 155 270 425 155 270 
R-squared 0.364 0.410 0.319 0.340 0.402 0.258 
Instrument Post 1989 Post 1989 Post 1989 EOM 2Y EOM 2Y EOM 2Y 
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
                                                 
31
 Post-1989 passes the weak instrument test (F-value=17.86, model 2), while the 2-years EOM instrument performs 
slightly worse (F-value=7.35, model 5). However, we used the Anderson-Rubin method (Finlay and Magnusson 
(2009) to estimate a valid confidence interval for weak instruments which confirms that the EOM coefficient in 
autocracies is statistically significant. 
32
 The instruments in the democracy regressions are weak; the F value for post-1989 in model 3 is 6 and the F value 
for 2-years regional EOM in model 6 is 2. The Anderson-Rubin confidence interval also confirms that the coefficient 
of EOM in democracies is not statistically significant. 
33
 Table A4 in the Appendix presents the 2SLS estimates for opposition victory using both post-1989 and 2-year EOM 
regional variations as instruments. 
34
 In the autocratic subset regressions, post-1989 is a strong instrument (F-value=16, model 2), whereas the 2 years 
regional EOM instrument performs worse (F-value=7, model 5). However, the Anderson-Rubin confidence interval 
for weak instruments confirms that the EOM coefficient is statistically significant. 
35
 Both instruments are weak in the democratic subset regressions. Applying the Anderson-Rubin method to estimate 
a valid confidence interval confirms that EOM are not statistically significant in these models. 
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A common problem with IV models consists in providing strong and sufficient justification 
for the exclusion restriction which, by definition, cannot be empirically tested (Angrist and Pischke 
2008; Imbens 2014). The weakness of the instruments is also a source of concern as it may 
compromise both the size of the coefficient and statistical inference. In fact, finding a suitable 
instrument for EOM has been challenging in the existing literature. As Kelley (2011) indicates: 
³Most traditional methods to correct for selection require a variable that can be used as an 
instrument²a variable that is correlated with the independent variable of interest but is not 
theorized to have any effect on the dependent variable. Such variables are rare and, in the given 
context, not available.´SS-1540). 
To overcome the potential issues associated with the difficulty of finding an appropriate 
instrument, we re-estimate our models using matching.36 This quasi-experimental method is 
suggested as an alternative to IV by both Kelley (2011, 2012) and Daxecker (2012, 2014) in their 
work on monitoring. Our estimation uses a propensity score matching routine where the treatment 
model is estimated using a logit algorithm. Table 4 below shows the effect of monitoring on vote 
margins and opposition victory respectively. When using vote margin as a dependent variable, the 
direction and statistical significance of the matching estimators coincide with our previous 
findings. When the dependent variable is opposition victory, again the direction of the coefficients 
holds but monitoring is only significant in the pooled model. Overall, these alternative estimations 
accounting for selection issues confirm our main theoretical claims about the how political regimes 
condition the effectiveness of electoral competition as well as provide robustness to our empirical 
analysis.37  
                                                 
36
 We use propensity score matching as implemented by the STATA command teffects psmatch. 
37
 These analyses are however limited in one sense. Our estimations clearly reveal that EOM have an effect on electoral 
competition at the national level in authoritarian regimes but our data does not allow us to identify cheating that could, 
for example, be happening at the sub-national level, and only exert its effects locally. 
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Table 4 ± Matching with Vote Margin (VM) and Opposition Victory (OV) as dependent 
variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pooled Autocracies Democracies Pooled Autocracies Democracies 
EOM -9.775*** -21.923** -0.845 0.112** 0.070 0.085 
 (3.302) (9.655) (3.615) (0.058) (0.094) (0.070) 
Observations 412 150 262 425 155 270 
Dep. Variable VM VM VM OV OV OV 
 
Alternative explanations 
Beyond the presence of monitors, the type of organizations that send observation missions 
is also important (Kelley 2012, Donno and Simpser 2012). Following the work by Pevehouse 
(2002), one can expect that IGOs dominated by non-democratic country-members would be more 
likely to overlook some forms of electoral misconduct or be more lenient in their reports. On top 
of this, inviting multiple missions of varying quality levels may be desirable for cheating 
incumbents, as contradictory verdicts from different EOM may soften the negative repercussions 
of a negative report (Daxecker and Schneider 2014). To account for the impact of the type of 
organization, and further check the robustness of our results, we created the variable constraints.  
Constraints measures the percentage of democratic member-states for each IGO that 
monitored elections; the logic is that the level of democraticness of an organization would largely 
dictate the quality of monitoring and the leniency of reports. We expect that missions from highly 
democratic organizations, such as the EU, should enhance competitiveness, whereas missions from 
less democratic organizations, like the African Union, less so, as they will be more likely to turn a 
blind eye to instances of manipulation. The variable ranges from 0 to 1; higher values indicate a 
higher percentage of democratic member states. For example, constraints equals 1 for the 
European Union, while the African Union ranges from 0.086 in the 1980s to 0.225 in the 2000s. 
In the case of multiple IGOs monitoring an election, constraints takes the score of the most 
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democratic IGO. For INGOs sending EOM, we follow Donno and Simpser (2012, p. 507) in 
coding high quality ones as being fully democratic, while the rest are coded as non-democratic.38  
Using this indicator as our new independent variable we re-estimate our models using both 
dependent variables (Table A5 in Appendix). As expected, the level of democraticness of an 
organization has an effect on the electoral environment; margins of victory decrease by around 
27% in autocracies when monitored by fully democratic IGOs (statistically significant at the 99% 
level), while in democracies the effect is not significant. When looking at opposition victory results 
show that the effect of observing an alternation in power is greater in autocracies (0.19) than in 
democracies (0.14) when elections are monitored by a fully democratic IGO, although both 
coefficients fall slightly short of conventional statistical significance tests.39  
 
Conclusions 
In this article, we offer a novel interpretation of the effectiveness of international electoral 
monitoring on the quality of elections. We argue that in order to properly understand how EOM 
operate, the dynamics of different political regimes must be considered. In particular, we argue 
that EOM limit the ability of incumbents to use electoral misconduct in the pursuit of electoral 
victory. We offer several mechanisms by which it may operate; through eliminating, reducing, 
changing the type, or by forcing the concealment of fraud. The increased costs of fraud associated 
with the presence of EOM open up political space for opposition parties and increase 
competitiveness. Moreover, the effects of monitoring should be more pronounced in non-
democratic settings, where electoral quality, on average, is lower. EOM presence in autocracies 
                                                 
38
 High quality INGOs are the Carter Center, the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, 
and the Asian Network for Free Elections. 
39
 The p-value for autocracies is 0.103 and for democracies is 0.114. 
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on the one hand may restrict the extent of manipulation, while on the other hand could embolden 
opposition parties; both mechanisms should increase electoral competitiveness. 
Our analysis provides evidence that monitored elections increase electoral competitiveness 
but only for dictatorships while it has little or no effect for democracies. More concretely, our 
findings show that margins of victory decrease significantly when monitoring occurs in 
authoritarian elections; in democracies, however, monitoring has no effect. Similarly, EOM are 
more likely to trigger political change in dictatorships than in democracies. Our analysis reveals 
that the presence of international monitors is positively associated with the likelihood of observing 
an electoral turnover in dictatorships. 
Our paper makes several contributions; firstly, it links the presence of observation missions 
with improvements on electoral competitiveness, offering several mechanisms that can account 
for it. Secondly, it considers the importance of political regimes and how they can condition EOM 
effectiveness. The literature up to now had been silent on this, but as this paper has exhibited, 
whether a country is a democracy or a dictatorship has a significant impact on monitoring. It is in 
dictatorships that the presence of missions is most effective, partly reflecting the more frequent 
use of misconduct in those regimes. Thirdly, LWUHIOHFWVRQUXOHUV¶GHFLVLRQVWRLQYLWHPLVVLRQVDQG
the impact that has theoretically, to our ability to understand the impact of missions, and 
empirically, to properly estimate their effect. Finally, it breaks down electoral competitiveness, 
distinguishing analytically between margins of victory and alternations of power. While our 
findings show that effects are quite similar, the two concepts are distinct and quite plausibly 
improvements in the former may not be reflected by increases in the latter. 
Our findings have important policy implications as they indicate some conditions under 
which EOM may be more effective in practice. Both IGOs and INGOs working on promoting 
28 
 
democracy by enhancing the quality of elections should consider focusing mostly on autocratic 
regimes. Our analysis suggests that the deterrence of electoral fraud normally associated with 
deploying international observers is more likely to materialize under these particular electoral 
conditions. 
Beyond our findings about the effects monitoring has on the competitiveness of elections, 
it remains unclear what the exact mechanisms at work are. While we hypothesize that some of 
these outcomes may be due to the restrictions imposed to the extent and tactics of manipulation 
used, our research design and data do not allow us to unearth the exact ways in which EOM affect 
the electoral environment. While the use of field experiments has provided some insights into how 
this may occur (Hyde 2007, 2010; Ichino and Schündeln 2012) there are still several open 
questions. We need to comprehend how the displacement of manipulation or alternative tools of 
misconduct employed by incumbents condition electoral competition. We also need to develop a 
better understanding about which manipulation tactics are more potent. Moreover, a thorough 
analysis of when and why incumbents invite missions is necessary to better understand the 
decision-making process behind that choice. Finally, we should investigate whether manipulation 
leaves a long term imprint on electoral competition, as recent work suggests (Simpser 2013). 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 ± Summary of descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
EOM 580 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Constraints 580 0.41 0.41 0 1 
Vote Margin 549 15.56 31.22 -53.7 99.14 
Opposition Victory 578 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Opposition support 558 29.75 14.55 0 96.1 
Democracy 580 0.58 0.49 0 1 
First election 580 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Election type 580 0.45 0.50 0 1 
GDP cap (log) 560 7.17 1.17 4.55 9.62 
Post 1989 580 0.81 0.40 0 1 
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Table A2 ± OLS detailed results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Pooled Democracy Autocracy Pooled Democracy Autocracy 
VARIABLES Vote 
Margin 
Vote 
Margin 
Vote 
Margin 
Opposition 
Victory 
Opposition 
Victory 
Opposition 
Victory 
       
EOM -20.12*** -3.66 -22.11*** 0.14** 0.15* 0.13* 
 (5.850) (3.598) (6.536) (0.065) (0.077) (0.075) 
Democracy -24.38***   0.30***   
 (7.877)   (0.103)   
Interaction 17.83**   -0.02   
 (7.452)   (0.090)   
First Election -2.73 0.87 -4.24 0.29** 0.26 0.24 
 (6.441) (6.355) (8.073) (0.120) (0.212) (0.189) 
Election Type -6.25 -2.50 -13.05 0.09 0.10 -0.04 
 (4.938) (4.045) (13.881) (0.112) (0.122) (0.169) 
GDP capita (log) 8.73 5.27 7.56 -0.17* -0.24 -0.07 
 (6.143) (8.299) (10.819) (0.101) (0.158) (0.162) 
Margin of victory 
(lag) 
-0.08 -0.21*** 0.01 0.00** 0.00** 0.00 
 (0.059) (0.066) (0.104) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Constant -23.90 -33.45 3.00 1.29* 2.19* 0.53 
 (44.244) (63.798) (72.019) (0.714) (1.205) (1.063) 
       
Observations 412 262 150 425 270 155 
R-squared 0.080 0.057 0.181 0.067 0.067 0.086 
# Countries 104 69 58 105 70 59 
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A3 ± 2SLS analysis using Vote Margin as dependent variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pooled Autocracies Democracies Pooled Autocracies Democracies 
       
EOM -61.98*** -63.05*** -1.581 -65.46*** -67.08*** -2.989 
 (15.643) (14.542) (12.00) (14.691) (14.456) (28.30) 
Democracy -55.83***   -52.77**   
 (17.685)   (22.292)   
Interaction 60.01***   55.22**   
 (19.856)   (27.636)   
First election 2.44 5.38 3.235 2.56 6.24 3.543 
 (7.917) (9.271) (5.373) (7.753) (9.023) (7.276) 
Election type -8.19 -19.84* -2.458 -7.40 -20.49* -2.201 
 (5.177) (11.533) (4.664) (5.539) (11.274) (6.040) 
GDP cap (log) 14.49** 12.23 9.416 14.21* 12.47 9.314 
 (6.850) (12.085) (7.493) (7.369) (12.464) (8.469) 
Margin of victory (lag) -0.11* -0.07 -0.220*** -0.12* -0.08 -0.220*** 
 (0.060) (0.106) (0.0667) (0.063) (0.115) (0.0675) 
Constant -7.40 4.54 -4.731 -3.32 6.41 -2.719 
 (42.947) (75.230) (47.06) (44.421) (76.705) (70.72) 
Observations 412 150 262 412 150 262 
R-squared 0.606 0.654 0.438 0.590 0.627 0.439 
Instrument Post 1989 Post 1989 Post 1989 EOM 2Y  EOM 2Y  EOM 2Y  
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A4 ± 2SLS coefficients using Opposition Victory as dependent variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pooled Autocracies Democracies Pooled Autocracies Democracies 
       
EOM 0.60*** 0.54*** 0.31 0.54** 0.56*** -0.269 
 (0.177) (0.185) (0.303) (0.223) (0.187) (0.773) 
Democracy 0.58***   0.81*   
 (0.225)   (0.460)   
Interaction -0.39   -0.73   
 (0.284)   (0.623)   
First election 0.23 0.10 0.12 0.24* 0.10 0.291 
 (0.138) (0.207) (0.283) (0.144) (0.208) (0.342) 
Election type 0.09 0.00 0.07 0.14 0.00 0.176 
 (0.112) (0.148) (0.134) (0.133) (0.145) (0.183) 
GDP cap (log) -0.22** -0.09 -0.27* -0.25** -0.09 -0.312 
 (0.109) (0.180) (0.167) (0.121) (0.183) (0.199) 
Margin of victory (lag) 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00** 0.00 0.00431** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.00171) 
Constant 0.79 0.04 1.51 0.98 0.03 2.309 
 (0.646) (1.052) (0.936) (0.716) (1.042) (1.536) 
Observations 425 155 270 425 155 270 
R-squared 0.364 0.410 0.319 0.340 0.402 0.258 
Instrument Post 1989 Post 1989 Post 1989 EOM 2Y EOM 2Y EOM 2Y 
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A5 ± Robustness test II: Use of constraints as alternative explanation 
 DV: Vote Margin DV: Opposition Victory 
VARIABLES Pooled Pooled 
   
Constraints -27.45*** 0.19 
 (7.953) (0.114) 
Democracy -23.46*** 0.30*** 
 (6.901) (0.097) 
Interaction 28.59*** -0.04 
 (8.661) (0.135) 
First election -0.55 0.28** 
 (6.600) (0.124) 
Election type -6.14 0.08 
 (4.553) (0.110) 
GDP cap (log) 10.84* -0.20** 
 (5.946) (0.098) 
Margin of victory (lag) -0.08 0.00** 
 (0.056) (0.001) 
Constant -41.98 1.50** 
 (42.637) (0.695) 
   
Observations 412 425 
R-squared 0.085 0.066 
Number of countries 104 105 
FE YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
